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I Will Go Into the Field 




Carla K. Stewart is a writer and 
artist currently based in Vancouver, 
British Columbia. Her practice is 
primarily comprised of writing and 
photography, and deals with themes 
of fact and iction, history and mem-
ory, perception and reality.
I want you to suddenly appear, seemingly out of 
nowhere with an avocado and cold Budweiser.  
But I can still hear that god damn alarm clock. 
It is blinking. 
Pervert. Poser. Pervert. Poser. 
Pervert. Poser. Pervert. Poser. 
It’s hard to wake up to the truth.
A diet of salmon and avocados and an abundance of red 
wine. I think I was put of by her physical likeness to my 
own mother. I suppose that sort of thing would do it for 
some boys, but I have premonitions of closed eyes during 
sex and awkward glances at the dinner table.
SPANISH MILK





In imagining possible worlds, one falls into the 
practice of storytelling—the act of describing 
what was, what is and what could be (prefera-
bly all at once). Reality plays an important role 
in each story told, acting as the drawing board. 
A iction will always show traces of the real, re-
sponding to the conditions of existence, moving 
with or against. In the same way, non-iction ges-
tures towards the imaginary in its mimetic repre-
sentations of reality. Our writers ind the impos-
sible task of distinguishing real and imaginary, 
iction and non-iction to be a productive, even 
necessary dilemma. Though there can be noth-
ing more satisfying than drawing a line, some-
times it can feel even better to draw four.
The confusion around what constitutes reality 
may arise from the complicated relationship of 
another structural pair: time and space. For the 
assumed singularity of time and space, the ele-
mental parts of any conceived reality or non-real-
ity, disallows the simultaneity of real and imagi-
nary worlds. Our exploration of possible worlds 
begins with acknowledging multiplicity—that 
we are not simply discussing ictions, fantasies, 
and imaginaries but diferent modes of existence 
that overlap with our own. More than holding 
potential to be multiple, time and space operate 
exclusively in the plural, extending far beyond our 
immediate experience. The sentiment sounds all 
too familiar. Yet how easliy what happened yesterday 
evokes a memory of tomorrow. 
So time and space have been and will become lib-
erated from linear, three-dimensional conceptions 
of reality. But what about storytelling? The structure 
of narrative protests the multiplication, unsure of 
how to respond to so many worlds at once. Fiction 
and non-iction bleed even further—reality has au-
thored ictions of itself, and no one knows which 
version to trust. The texts that come before and 
after attempt to ballast storytelling in its age of 
crisis, maneuvering multiple temporal and spatial 
dimensions at once. Maybe the plural world lacks 
an origin story: the beginning of being and expe-
rience in more than one dimension. The subjective 
account, the iterative “I” clones itself in an efort to 
accommodate. When we shift from one dimension 
to another, our sense of being changes, illustrated 
by stories of unknown territories.
Exploring all possible worlds not only implicates 
one’s understanding of self, but place as well, as 
space that’s been built up by body and language. 
Time and space aren’t all that exist anymore. Here, 
in these constructed spaces with constructed 
meanings, we recognize a neatly itted nar-
rative sequence—the telling of history. Like 
anything else in the plural universe, simula-
tions of place project onto what used to be 
called the real, forming hyperreal versions 
of the same. When the imaginary shapes 
the real, iction becomes non-iction and 
the story gets all out of order. The dominant 
order, or the dominant narrative, gives way 
to the force of many. In an efort to persist 
through the disorder, the story fragments it-
self, coming together from texts of disparate 
positions.
Jorge Luis Borges says: “Reality is not always 
probable, or likely.” Indeed, the assumed rad-
icalism of possible worlds might have been 
lost with linear time and ixed dimensions. 
Now it seems more radical to describe real-
ity with any sincerity or assuredness. The 
improbability of reality claimed by Borg-
es relects our belief in moving forward, 
scientists, architects and writers alike, at-
tempting to prove our hypothesis of every-
thing that may be. We ask you, our trusted 
readers, to listen to our stories knowing 
that, in another dimension, all the words 




Reality is not always probable, or likely.
Jorges Luis Borges in Columbia University Forum Vol. 1 (1971)

My everyday thoughts are occupied by those I love.  
Alongside thoughts of sex. Made up love affairs.  
 The New Year is nearly upon us and I find myself in an all too familiar situation.  
No money. No car. A girl I cannot trust. And no place to call my own. The only 
things missing are my wisdom teeth and a fuller head of hair. I’m finding this 
difficult. Not difficult like playing an instrument or driving a motorized vehicle.  
Difficult like attempting to finish a game of Monopoly.
A diet of propolis, garlic, ginger, and painkillers. 
I will be better in no fucking time. According to my ex-wife we were nev-
er married. But the breakup feels like a more than tragic divorce. 
Go back. A direct result of a diet of cocaine and organic cow’s milk, I’ve 
decided to Astroturf the deck. I’m interrupted by a Spanish girl with a 
Spanish lisp inquiring about a cappuccino. It would seem that I have 
proved myself right by proving myself wrong, but the fat girl doesn’t 
seem to understand that I do not want to be friends.
I welcome death under the Catalonian sun.  
But with that being said, there are certain things that I 
wouldn’t mind doing. Like sex. Or having a cup of cofee and 
maybe a snack from Dunkin Donuts. And inding a paper with 
a horoscope hidden somewhere in its pages, then getting 
really pissed of when I can’t read it.
The concept of a higher or another dimension 
is one of those classic science-iction tropes that 
appears, like an unidentiied lying object, to be 
without any pre-modern history or precedent. 
The notion of the metaphysical higher or lower 
world, in German the hinterwelt (‘world behind’), 
is probably as old as humanity itself, and at least 
as old as shamanistic out-of-body experiences.
 Popular myths of the metaphysical plane refer 
to specialized discourses, mystical languages or 
ways of using language, involving deep relection 
on the nature of the world as it appears through 
experience. In this sense, science iction creators 
work in a long and popular tradition of cribbing 
ideas for stories from the wizards of knowledge, 
borrowing the mathematical notion of dimension 
as the image or idea of metaphysical experience.
Perhaps what is unique about the modern con-
text is that prevalent scientiic terminology 
seems directly anathema to metaphysical expe-
rience. Before modernity, forms of respected and 
operative knowledge still conceived a world 
above which was an immaterial realm, an es-
sence beyond material reality and yet somehow 
accessible to experience. Never before in history 
has a belief in the world we sense and measure 
been more exclusive, as the scientiic world-
view of Descartes, Galileo, Bacon and Newton 
has largely become our Global Common Sense 
(GCS).  According to widely accepted scientiic 
deinition there is no other dimension in the 
sense of a quintessential realm, heaven or hell, 
The dificulty here is the mistaken assumption of a classical ontology based on 
a belief in a world populated by independently existing things with determinate 
boundaries and properties that move around in a container called “space” in step 
with a linear sequence of moments called time. But the evidence indicates that the 
world does not operate according to any such classical ontology (Barad 2012, 43).
or a hinterwelt. When modern science refers to its 
three dimensions, it suggests that we can measure 
three perpendicularly arranged axes in three-di-
mensional space—length, height and depth—and 
that’s all there is. In other words, according to GCS 
it is possible to draw three lines that are perfectly 
perpendicular to each other and not parallel. Travel 
to somewhere not in this universe of three dimen-
sions falls into categories of entertainment and 
fairy tales, at best; at worst, it smacks of new age 
babble or mental illness. Nevertheless, among the 
startling implications and discoveries of twenti-
eth century science, ones as yet suppressed from 
popular knowledge by the historically unparal-
leled force of GCS, there lies the possibility of di-
mensions beyond the comprehensible three. Sci-
ence, not myth, indicates the possible existence 
of these—even their necessity.  
GCS has provisionally accepted ‘string’ theory, 
which takes up the problem of multiple or even 
ininite dimensions, but at the price of insisting 
that this bears no direct relation to anything 
we could ever experience.  Similarly, Einstein 
helped popularize the notion that time is the fourth 
dimension, and uniied with the other three spa-
tial dimensions as space-time.  However, the idea 
has not resulted in much experiential substance 
for GCS. In general, theories like Einstein’s rela-
tivity, quantum theory, and cybernetic systems 
theory appear to GCS to involve queer notions of 
time. They suggest that time, rather than being a 
single line moving from past through present to 
future, operates as a complex web or lattice where 
multiple pasts can return as futures, past and 
future intersect in an unusual way, and the notion 
of present expands. Einstein further insisted that 
time was not separate from space but part of a 
uniied ield of space-time. Again, the partisans of 
GCS understand abstractly that Einstein uniied 
space and time, but this union remains strange 
and inaccessible to experience. 
Most startling about the new conceptualization 
of space-time, gingerly avoided by mainstream 
science, is what it implies for the experience 
and reality of subjectivity, the self.  The startling 
or even traumatic nature of this experience of 
self, one utterly alien to the GCS, has forestalled 
greater understanding of a new sense of time, 
consigned it to ‘new age’ fringes of culture and 
the psychedelic revolution. So perhaps it is no 
surprise that in twenty-irst century America, 
the great cathedral of GCS, contemporary practi-
tioners of space-time and its revolutionary impact 
on human self-understanding have also received 
the brand ‘queer.’
This essay describes the ‘queer’  (not homosexual in 
the literal sense, but I think not traditionally het-
eronormative either) theory presented by early 
twentieth century Russian writer P. D. Ouspensky, 
which I believe shows with unparalleled clarity 
the experiential implications of the ‘uniied ield’ 
theory of space-time. I show a kind of queer kin-
ship between Ouspensky’s thought and an entire 
underground twentieth-century tradition in science 
that seems to have quieted since the 1960s, but 
inds newly coherent and relevant contemporary 
expression in queer and-or feminist theorists 
such as Judith Butler, Donna Haraway and Karen 
Barad. The new sense of time I speak to radically 
alters sense of self, decenters the subject, and 
produces a plural and self-remembering sub-
jectivity in place of the monolithic self-identical 
subject characteristic of the patriarchal West.
In her “Cyborg Manifesto,” Donna Haraway asks: 
“What kind of politics could embrace partial, con-
tradictory, permanently unclosed constructions 
of personal and collective selves and still be 
faithful, efective and, ironically, socialist-femi-
nist?” (Haraway 1991, 157) The queerness of Har-
away’s science-theory lies not only in its overt 
formulations about sexuality, but in the speciic 
way that it brings the focus of theoretical cogni-
tion on self and experience into the space of sci-
ence, the domain of power-knowledge currently 
dominated by doctrines amenable to GCS. Her 
focus on self and identity is precisely what is 
rigorously excluded from GCS-authorized ac-
counts of the meaning of quantum and relativity 
theories.  
While the core problematic of Judith Butler’s 
1997 The Psychic Life of Power—briely, how 
does a subject which does not yet exist respond 
to a call of power-knowledge that brings her 
into being in the irst place? —could be quite 
directly linked to the queer behaviour of light-
ning, the atom’s performativity, and more gen-
erally to the problem of causality and obser-
vation that is central to quantum and relativity 
theories. Butler’s work, along with Hegelianism 
and Foucaultianism in toto, has so far been con-
signed to the humanistic, cultural and literary 
side of the great disciplinary divide.  In general 
we have seen the continuing and intensifying 
relegation of subjective concerns to the side of 
“non-science” (perhaps nowhere more spectacu-
larly than in the infamous “Sokal afair” of 1996). 
We have seen this blind disciplinary relegation of 
subject and object to ‘where they belong’ practiced 
with abandon by way of GCS, which ironically is 
no less inconsistent with science than theories of 
phlogiston and a lat earth.
In agential realism, and speciically in concepts 
like spacetimemattering, Karen Barad vividly 
draws out the human implications of natural sci-
ence as something immanent to the ield—some-
thing as “objective” and “real” as it is concerned 
with the nature of gender and the self. Barad’s 
work reinforces the fact that the aim was (and is) 
never to take a ‘humanistic’ by-way of Foucaultian 
post-structuralism or continental philosophy, but 
rather to directly extend the most important sci-
entiic discoveries of the twentieth century from 
within. Thus the aim will be not merely to inter-
pret power-knowledge and GCS, but to change 
them.
My interest in Ouspensky stems from the fact 
that he, along with a number of other ‘minor’ and/
or queer igures in twentieth century science,
shows striking commonalities with Barad’s bold 
new forays. Indeed, we might look at agential re-
alism as the voice of a whole suppressed tradition 
of relecting on the implications of modern sci-
entiic research for the self and experience. What 
has been suppressed in mainstream accounts of 
quantum and relativity theories is precisely that 
which concerns both Ouspensky and Barad: what 
do these theories mean for our experience of the 
world?  How can we see, hear, feel or touch these 
meanings? Mainstream accounts often suggest 
that quantum theory and the uncertainty princi-
ple only have meaning at the abstract levels of 
the microscopic or cosmic-macroscopic. Ouspen-
sky, much like Barad and Haraway in this respect, 
begs to difer. I would like to place Ouspensky 
in a kind of rhizomatic non-family-non-tree with 
queer feminist science.
Kant’s Discovery 
& the Positivist Impasse
Ouspensky’s magnum opus, Tertium Organum 
(posing ambitiously as a sequel to Aristotle’s and 
Bacon’s respective seminal works Organum and 
Novum Organum) uses analogies and imagery 
to convey often-neglected aspects of the mod-
ern scientiic understanding of nature. Much like 
post-structuralism and post-modernism, Ouspen-
sky’s work is indebted to Kant’s formulation of the 
problem of knowledge and experience. Indeed, 
holding up the ideas of Barad and Ouspensky 
alongside others of the minor tradition in twenti-
eth century science one can see a common orien-
tation in Kant’s diferentiation of noumenon and 
phenomenon:
Kantian idealism recognizes a world of caus-
es outside of us, but asserts that we cannot 
know the world by means of sensuous per-
ception, and everything that we perceive, 
generally speaking, is of our own creation—
the product of a cognizing being. So, ac-
cording to Kant, everything that we ind 
in things is put in them by ourselves. In-
dependently of ourselves we do not know 
what the world is like. And our cognition 
of things has nothing in common with 
things as they are outside us—that is, in 
themselves (Ouspensky 1969, 12-13). 
The phenomena, Kant famously argued, con-
sist of all that we ever experience through our 
senses. The phenomena, taken as an ensemble, 
form the world we experience inside and out-
side our skin. The noumenal, on the contrary, 
is the metaphysical properly speaking, all that 
we do not sense or experience but which must 
be presupposed in order to explain what we 
experience. The noumenal realm, which twen-
tieth century physicist David Bohm has called 
“the implicate order,” (Bohm 1980) contains all 
those invisible and intangible aspects of the 
universe that have important visible or sensi-
ble efects, notwithstanding their invisibility or 
insensibility as causes. 
  
The power of Kant’s formulation, which for Ous-
pensky makes him “impossible to controvert,” 
(Ouspensky 1969, 15) lies in its negativity. In fo-
cusing on what we do not know, and particularly 
what we know we do not know, we gain a power-
ful tool for the continual reduction of errors due 
to wrong mapping. It is not that we can say a 
realm beyond the senses exists; it is that we know, 
through the passage of experience itself, that we 
do not experience everything that exists—or at 
least, not all at once, not while we’re alive. We 
might say, speaking broadly, that voices of the mi-
nor or rhizomatic tradition in twentieth century 
science-theory have attempted many times to 
remind the prevailing scientiic mindset, hypno-
tized as it is by doctrines of positivist empiricism 
still guided by the general terms laid down in Ba-
con’s ‘new’ organ, of the incontrovertibility of the 
‘new new’ doctrine of uncertainty given form in 
Kant’s writing. As Ouspensky puts it: 
Positive philosophy stands in a very am-
biguous relation to Kant’s views. It accepts 
them and it does not accept them: it accepts, 
and considers them correct in their relation 
to the direct experience of the organs of 
sense—what we see, hear, touch... When it 
concerns itself with “scientiic experience” 
however, in which precise instruments and 
calculations are used, positive philosophy 
evidently considers Kant’s view in relation 
to that invalid, assuming that “scientiic 
experience” makes known to us the very 
substance of things, the true causes of our 
sensations—or if it does not do so now, it 
brings us closer to the truth of things... [I]
n other words, they believe exactly in the 
possibility of what Kant denied—the com-
prehension of the true substance of things 
by means of the investigation of phenomena 
(Ouspensky 1969, 15).
Ouspensky, carrying forward Kant’s trenchant 
insight into the uncertainty of knowledge, calls 
out the positivistic scientist for his lack of “suf-
ficient courage to declare that he believes in 
nothing at all,” 
. . . he accoutres himself in all contradictory 
theories, as in an oicial uniform, only be-
cause with this uniform are bound up cer-
tain rights and privileges, outer as well as 
inner, consisting of a certain conidence 
in himself and is surroundings, to forego 
which he has no strength and no determina-
tion (Ouspensky 1969, 16).
Calling out the contradictions of positivism in 
a Kantian vein, however, is only the beginning 
of Ouspensky’s ‘new new organum.’ Ouspensky 
does not, as may be anticipated by post-modern 
critics of scientiic discourses, aim at a new or 
more comprehensive regime of truth in science, 
nor to restore the moribund Western Subject. 
Rather, he aims at what Derrida might have called 
the deconstruction of logocentric subjectivity. In 
other words, he will carry forward a new Kantian 
theory of knowledge into a radically new theory 
of experience and subjectivity, toward something 
queerly like that “permanently unclosed construc-
tion of personal and collective selves” formulated 
by Donna Haraway.  
Space-time and the 
Dimensions of Experience
One of Ouspensky’s primary points of focus in Ter-
tium Organum is the scientiic and mathematical 
formulation of a fourth dimension in space. GCS 
accepts that Einstein and other modern physi-
cists have, for purposes of convenience, called 
the fourth dimension ‘time,’ and that Einstein 
referred to ‘space-time’ as a uniied ield in his 
theory. But GCS tells us the efects of this unity 
of space and time can never be experienced by 
a living human body. GCS can accept that at as-
tronomical distances and speeds the diference 
between space and time breaks down. We hear 
that extra-ordinarily steep curvatures of space-
time such as black holes can lead to noticeable 
distortions of spatio-temporal existence. GCS 
might even accept that everyday experience of 
the Earth’s gravity is the result of a curvature of 
space or space-time—yet this does not change 
the fact that for GCS gravity is practically and 
wrongly identiied with an electro-magnetic 
force, because of a disbelief in the notion that 
the ‘empty space’ imagined by Newton is an en-
tity that could be curved.
Ouspensky argues that Einstein and modern 
science need to unify space with time, not only 
supericially or under special circumstances but 
more generally, to consider space and time as 
similar and comparable in some fundamental 
sense. To make this palpable and clear in a more 
than abstract way requires recourse to analogy—
in short, because it is very di cult for us to imag-
ine time as having existence like space, as being 
‘perpendicular to space.’ Using an ingenious, if 
not original mathematical thought experiment, 
Ouspensky indicates what we cannot presently 
experience by extrapolating from what we can 
and do. 

In E.A. Abbott’s imaginative science-iction parable, Flatland: 
A Romance of Many Dimensions (1884) we see an earlier form 
of Ouspensky’s experiment demonstrated in rigorous narra-
tive fashion. Nearly one hundred years later, Carl Sagan would 
perform his own version of the experiment for a television 
audience.  For Ouspensky, the Kantian problem of the nou-
mena calls for an inquiry into dimensions beyond the three 
that we experience directly. Quoting extensively from anoth-
er mathematical-dimensional pioneer, C. H. Hinton, Ouspen-
sky argues that the true inheritors of Kant are not Hegel and 
Fichte, but the mathematicians Gauss and Lobachevsky.
In mathematical terms, when we say the world has three di-
mensions it means that it is possible to draw three perpen-
dicular lines in our perceptual space. In four-dimensional 
space, it would be possible to draw a fourth line, perpendicu-
lar to the other three. The same would hold true respectively 
for spaces of ive, six or more dimensions—ive, six or more 
perpendiculars:
Through a given point it is possible to drawn only three 
perpendicular and not parallel straight lines.  Upon this 
as a basis, we deine the dimensionality of space by the 
number of lines it is possible to draw in it which are mu-
tually at right angles one with another. The line upon 
which there cannot be a perpendicular, that is, another 
line, constitutes linear, or one-dimensional space. Upon 
the surface two perpendiculars are possible. This is 
supericial, or two-dimensional space. In “space” three 
perpendiculars are possible. This is solid, or three-di-
mensional space (Ouspensky 1969, 23).
 
However, “mathematics does not feel dimensions… it is im-
possible to express mathematically the diference between 
dimensions.” (Ouspensky 1969, 65) We can mathematically 
describe a world of any dimensions, 
many more than three, but only em-
bodied experience gives us the incom-
parable experience of up and down, 
left and right, forward and backward 
that constitutes three-dimensionali-
ty. It is precisely the fact-like quality 
of this three-dimensional experience 
that GCS takes as evidence that the 
three dimensions are all that exist. 
 
Echoing Kant’s criticism, however, what 
this experience shows for Ouspensky 
is not the facticity of the three-dimen-
sional world, if by facticity we mean 
‘certainty of existence.’ Indeed, Kant’s 
very discovery (echoed by Hume) is 
that facts are an aspect of the phenom-
enal world about which we cannot be 
empirically certain. Rather, we must 
accept that our perception in terms 
of three spatial dimensions with time 
added is something put in the world by 
ourselves. We cannot directly perceive 
time as a fourth dimension of space, 
but a little help from mathematics—E. 
A. Abbott’s enthralling mental exper-
iment, reiterated by C. H. Hinton and 
Carl Sagan—provides the key to open-
ing our imagination, perceiving time 
not as something added to space or 
outside it, but a spatial dimension 
in itself. In other words, Ouspensky 
is inviting us to consider time as an 
‘impossible’ fourth perpendicular of 
space, which transforms the three-dimensional 





To help us imagine the tesseract, Ouspensky 
takes us stepwise on a trans-dimensional jour-
ney, beginning in worlds with fewer dimensions 
than our own.  At each stage he asks the ques-
tion that remains taboo for GSC: what would it 
be like to experience such a world? In asking us 
to imagine the limits of that experience, Ous-
pensky richly evokes the limits of our three-di-
mensional experience of the world.
(1) 
Ouspensky does not spend much efort in Point-
land (also the land of the black hole). In a world 
of zero dimensions nothing ever changes or 
happens and there are no entities, or the whole 
universe is one single entity. However if we, the 
point-being, were to gain just one degree of free-
dom, if we could scan backward and forward 
along a line, we would be setting of on a journey 
in Lineland:
Let us imagine a world of one dimension.  
It will be a line.  Upon this line let us imag-
ine living beings. Upon this line, which represents the 
universe for them, they will be able to move forward and 
backward only, and these beings will be as the points, or 
segments of a line. Nothing will exist for them outside 
their line—and they will not be aware of the line upon 
which they are living and moving.  For there will exist 
only two points, ahead and behind, or maybe just one 
point ahead. Noticing changes in states of these points, 
the one-dimensional being will call these changes phe-
nomena (Ouspensky 1969, 51).
All the phenomena are absolutely identical in this one-di-
mensional world—either the disappearance or appearance of 
another point behind or ahead.  We or the ‘point’ ahead of us 
might well be a line segment and not merely a point, but be-
cause the world is a one-dimensional line, we will never know 
it. In a one-dimensional world, we can’t see around anything, 
as it were. We only ever see a point and only imagine seeing 
ourselves as a point.  Nevertheless, over the course of time, 
with the mysterious appearance and disappearance of points 
ahead and behind, we become aware of something we call 
‘time.’ Points that once existed appear later to be gone; new 
points emerge which appear not to have existed before. We 
assume that what was past is gone and what lies in the future 
is yet to come.
  
We will never know if the points we encounter along the way 
result from the passing of our scan line across a surface-struc-
ture of two dimensions, moving perpendicular to the one 
dimension that limits our experience. We’d feel any part of 
the structure the line had already scanned as a point no lon-
ger exists, and any that the line scans toward as a point that 
will exist. We would not perceive that our one-dimensional 
view was preventing us from seeing that ‘past’ and ‘future’ 
points still do exist on the two-dimensional surface, merely 
in a place other than the scan-line in 
which we are currently trapped.  
(2)
If we, thus far a point-being, could by 
some gift of the cosmos suddenly per-
ceive ourselves to be a line, we could 
set of once more on the interdimen-
sional journey, gain yet another degree 
of freedom by now moving perpendic-
ularly to the original scan line (itself 
constructed by moving back and forth 
from the original zero-dimensional 
point). We would then be tracing a 
surface, a world of two dimensions, 
Flatland.  Similarly to the point-be-
ing arriving in Lineland, as line-being 
we have a new degree of freedom in 
Flatland, but we still cannot perceive 
what a three-dimensional being would 
be able to see looking down upon the 
plane. Rather, trapped in the plane, we 
see our self and encounter others only 
as edges, lines:
Let us next consider the two-di-
mensional world, and the being 
living on a plane . . . First of all 
we can airm that he will not feel 
the plane upon which he lives 
. . . The lines will difer from the 
plane in that they produce sen-
sations; therefore they exist.  The 
plane does not produce sensa-
tions, therefore it does not exist….  
But gradually, by a process of reasoning, 
the two-dimensional being will come to 
the conclusion that the igures he encoun-
ters exist one something, or in something.  
Thereupon he may name such a plane (he 
will not know, indeed, that it is a plane) the 
“ether.”  Accordingly he will declare that the 
“ether” ills all space, but difers in its quali-
ties from “matter.”  By “matter” he will mean 
lines.  Having come to this conclusion the 
two-dimensional being will regard all pro-
cesses as happening in his “ether,” i.e., in his 
space (Ouspensky 1969, 53).
Notably, at each stage of development, Ouspen-
sky’s beings are incapable of seeing the fullness 
of an existence that becomes visible only with 
a higher degree of freedom. Because a being in 
three-dimensional space could rise above the 
surface of Flatland, in a direction perpendicular 
to both its width and length, she would see the 
full two dimensions of the surface-beings where 
they would only see each other as lines. Just as 
we imagined the point being incapable of sens-
ing its Lineland as scanning across a spatial 
surface, which it therefore believes to be time, 
we can imagine the line-being as incapable of 
sensing its Flatland scanning ‘slices’ through 
a three-dimensional volume. The third dimen-
sion, then, could only appear to the plane being 
as time:
Therefore, though not conceiving the 
form of his universe, and regarding it as 
ininite in all directions, the plane being 
will nevertheless involuntarily think of 
the past as situated at one side of all, and 
of the future as somewhere at the other 
side of this totality.  In such manner the 
plane being will conceive of the idea of 
time (Ouspensky 1969, 57).
 
(3)
And so Ouspensky, coming to his crux, notes 
that at each dimensional stage, time appears 
as the limit of a being’s capacity to sense space. 
Time appears as the passage of a scan through 
a spatial context that is one dimension greater. 
A kind of GCS operates on each dimensional 
level (line, plane, volume) as a separator func-
tion, shunting the invisible spatial dimensions 
out of space and into temporal experience.
  
The scan-line crosses the surface. The slice-sur-
face passes through the volume. His imagina-
tion catching ire, raising his sling against the 
Goliath of GCS, Ouspensky asks: What is it that 
the volume-scan is passing through?
We are going forward like a blind man, 
who feels paving stones and lanterns and 
walls of houses with his stick and believes 
in the real existence of only that which 
he touches now, which he feels now… The 
blind man remembers the route which 
he has traversed; he expects that ahead 
the way will continue, but he sees neither 
forward nor backward because he does 
not see anything; because his instrument 
of knowledge—the stick—has a deinite, 
and not very great length, and 
beyond the reach of his stick 
non-existence begins (Ouspen-
sky 1969, 35).
Ouspensky employs analogy and 
thought experimentation because it al-
lows him to give abstract mathematical 
formulations palpable meaning. In his 
analogies we gain a sense of precisely 
what Einstein meant by compound-
ing space-time as a fourth dimension. 
As Ouspensky notes, “. . . we can say 
that the direction of the movement 
in the fourth dimension lies out of all 
those directions which are possible in 
a three-dimensional igure.” (Ouspen-
sky 1969, 29) This direction, perpen-
dicular to the three that are accessible 
through sense perception, scans the 
world holographically, ‘setting of’ 
from the world of three dimensions 
just as our original point-being ‘set 
of’ from itself to form the line:
The four-dimensional body is 
the ininite number of three-di-
mensional bodies. That is, the 
four-dimensional body is the 
ininite number of moments of 
existence of the three-dimen-
sional one—its states and po-
sitions. The three-dimensional 
body which we see appears as a 
single igure—one of a series of 
pictures on a cinematographic ilm as it were (Ouspen-
sky 1969, 45).
The past and the future, in other words, do not disappear 
from existence as we imagine—they merely pass into a region 
of space-time inaccessible by our limited ‘volume scan’ of the 
tesseract-space. They are still there. 
 
At irst glance, it might seem that Ouspensky’s model of 
time leads to determinism, in that all change and motion are 
merely an illusion of a scan moving through a ixed struc-
ture. However—and at the point analogy really reaches its 
limit—the total space-time ield through which the ‘volume 
scan’ does not exist as a static entity, because precisely what 
we call a ‘static entity’ would be an object limited to three 
dimensions. So, though Ouspensky claims the past and the 
future exist ‘alongside’ the present and afect it in ways GCS 
cannot imagine, he is in no way a determinist. The tesser-
act-structure contains all potentialities of all times and spac-
es, but they are not laid out in anything we could imagine as 
a ixed order:
As a matter of fact, in reality our relation both to the past 
and to the future is far more complicated than it seems 
to us. In the past, behind us, lies not only that which re-
ally happened, but that which could have been. In the 
same way, in the future lies not only that which will be, 
but everything that may be (Ouspensky 1969, 38).
It is at precisely at this point that GCS will step in and in-
sist that, notwithstanding these incontrovertible discoveries, 
in everyday existence, in fact in any existence in which our 
body could survive, the relation between time and space will 
remain essentially consistent with the Newtonian principles 
of matter-in-motion. Of course a singularity like a black hole 
may be theorized as a collapse of a segment of 
three-dimensional volume into the “implicate 
order.” Travelling at near light-speed relative to 
another object, my size will change relative to 
the other object and time will pass diferently. 
But apart from extreme cases, the experience 
of which nobody would survive anyway, GCS 
would like to reassure us that the basic New-
tonian principles of three spatial dimensions 
with an added dimension of time are necessary 
and unavoidable.
The Queer Thing 
About Subjectivity
Ouspensky and others in this minor rhizome of 
twentieth century thought —a non-tree which 
nevertheless spreads and speaks to the whole 
ediice of power-knowledge, both of the era 
and of our own—realize that black holes are not 
the only singularities in this universe. Life is 
also a singularity; living beings are forms-in-
time. Frozen or petriied, they would not be not 
what they are. Their present three-dimension-
al volume scan is a manifold of all the organ-
ism’s past experiences and, in conjunction with 
the environment, of all it will experience until 
death. “The child is the father to the man,” or 
“from the acorn grows the oak tree.” And there 
is no queerer being, in terms of the three-di-
mensional volume scan, than the humble hu-
man subject. For the human subject, much 
more than other living beings, seems unusual-
ly well-equipped to keep comparative records 
of that volume-scanning process she 
calls time, myth, history, archaeologies 
of knowledge. She is able to come to 
terms with time as the result of a con-
stitutive limit of her sensory apparatus, 
and therefore able to speak the truth to 
power-knowledge. Butler elaborates in 
Psychic Life of Power:
If conditions of power are to per-
sist, they must be reiterated; the 
subject is precisely the site of 
such reiteration, a repetition that 
is never merely mechanical. As 
the appearance of power shifts 
from the condition of the sub-
ject to its efects, the conditions 
of power (prior and external) as-
sume a present and futural form. 
But power assumes this present 
character through a reversal of 
its direction, one that performs a 
break with what has come before 
and dissimulates as a self-inau-
gurating agency. The reiteration 
of power not only temporalizes 
the conditions of subordination 
by shows these conditions to be, 
not static structures, but tempo-
ralized—active and productive.  
The temporalization performed 
by reiteration traces the route by 
which power’s appearance shifts 
and reverses: the perspective of 
power alters from what is always 
working on us from the outside 
and from the outset to what constitutes the sense of 
agency at work in our present acts and the futural ex-
panse of their efects (Butler 1997, 16). 
What does Butler mean by “the temporalization performed 
by reiteration”? She draws our attention, queerly like Ouspen-
sky, to the nature of our experience of self as something dis-
continuous, or even non-existent, whose continuity through 
time is only constituted in a complex reiterative or cyclical 
process. This minor rhizome tells us that the self is, in fact, 
rhizomatic—it is one-thousand plateaus (or are they abysses?) 
and above all, it is not one thing over time. The experience 
of the self, itself, as something that persists while always 
changing, indeed as what may seem the only ixed point in a 
world of change, lies in the fourth dimension. In the self we 
experience the fourth dimension ‘as if’ by our senses—by our 
‘inner sense.’ If we look with our undivided and unconfused 
attention, if we do not forget the ‘incontrovertibility’ of Kant, 
we ind that we contain many little selves or aspects of self 
within us, never just one, never one inal whole. To identify 
with one of its many iterations reduces the self to one frozen 
volume-scan in the queer tesseract of experience:
‘Identifying’ is one of our most terrible foes. It is neces-
sary to see and to study identifying to its very roots in 
oneself. Identifying is the chief obstacle to self-remem-
bering. A man who identiies with everything is unable 
to remember himself. In order to remember oneself it is 
necessary not to identify. But in order not to identify a 
man must irst of all not be identiied with himself. He 
must remember that there are two in him, one that can 
only observe at irst and another that takes charge of 
him at every moment and speaks in his name and calls 
itself ‘I’.
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Twenty minutes I’ve been awake.  
Twenty minutes I’ve been thinking of that little boy… who was he?? 
On board my grandfather’s boat, attempting to lift the deck in rhythm with the 
crashing waves. We knew something would go wrong.  
 His motor skills were astonishingly advanced for his age, and 
 though there were dozens of float compartments he could 
 have escaped to, the corner of the deck came down on his 
               fragile head. 
We weren’t strong enough 
  to keep it elevated against the weight of the waves.
 fragile head. 
He seemed ok, slightly stunned. 
He made it one or two feet before collapsing. 
 I could feel the tears building as I cried for someone to 
phone an ambulance, even though I knew very well that it was 
already too late.    My irst instinct was to pick him up.  
But I only held his infant hand as I watched his emotionless face 
slowly turn black and blue, 
 his eyes glazed with fear of the unknown.
  , li tl  t . 
  it   t  f t f  ll i . 
  l  f l t  t  il i    i  f   t  
  l ,  t     ll t t it  
l  t  l t .     t i ti t  t  i  i  .  
t  l  l  i  i f t    t  i  ti l  f  
l l  t  l   l , 
 i   l  it  f  f t  .
The city of Brüsel does not exist. It is an obscure city. In fact, it 
is but one of nearly a dozen unknowable cities that occupy an 
entire continent of an autonomous world parallel to our own. 
Despite its obscurity, a considerable amount has been written 
about this world. A full and deep drama of history, geography, 
culture, money, and power play out across the territories of this 
continent of hidden, unknown cities. The drama is document-
ed in a series of French language comic books titled Les Cités 
Obscures. American publishers translated the title of the series 
as “Fantastic Cities,” but this translation is misleading. Brüsel is 
too believable to be fantastic—too impenetrable, too speciical-
ly vague. One gets the sense that they have been there before; 
the city almost feels real. This is because of its uncanny resem-
blance to the “real” city of Brussels, Belgium. Brüsel hosts many 
of the attendant icons, the Palais du Justice, the river Senne, the 
old world urban informality. But perhaps it is the city’s impulse 
towards Modernization that is most strikingly consistent. These 
resonances give Brüsel the contours and the texture of reality. 
On the other hand, the city’s impossibility makes it unreal. It is 
something categorically diferent than a city or even a represen-
tation of a city. It is evidence of a certain other. Brüsel, in other 
words, is not the ictional city or the real city, it is the mediator 
between the two. It is translation with interference, the aura of 
Benjamin and obtuse, third meaning of Barthes.
If Brussels is a legible text of modernization, evidencing the 
triumph of bureaucratic state ambition (European uniication/
democratic and parliamentary processes), Brüsel is pure image. 
It is what the ilm-still is to the ilm, or perhaps more accurately, 
the still of the ilm set while ilming is in progress. Brüsel is an 
imperfect and impossible relection void of symbolic meaning, 



















metropolis par excellence. Natives of the city know it as Brux-
elles (French) or Brussel (Flemish), but equal claims could be 
made for Brüssel (German), Bruselas (Spanish), and Brussels 
(English). These are luid signiiers of an immovable signiied. 
Brüsel (the name holds all and none of the real city) is the in-
verse. It is all signiier with no signiied, yet the production of 
the relected image is active. It not only reveals that which was 
unseen, it produces the possibility for something new, an al-
ternative. While Brussels ofers a singular truth, Brüsel tells a 
lie that produces many possible truths—a mirror that lies only 
to tell the truth—as its name betrays. The reality of Brüsel thus 
questions the reality of its material other.
Brüsel, published in 1992, and the entire parallel world of Les 
Cités Obscures, is result of nearly two decades of collaborative 
work between comic book artist Francois Schuiten and writer, 
philosopher and critic Benoit Peeter.  Since beginning the book 
series in 1983 with the irst obscure city, Samaris, the authors 
have collaborated to construct a counter-mythology to the world 
we inhabit by constructing its other, Les Cités Obscures. While 
each book in the series stands alone as an autonomous narra-
tive, they also reference the existence of the entire, undisclosed 
world that is being constructed. The books produce a trans-tex-
tual image that leverages worlds both internal and external to 
those which the authors create. In 2011 a guide book to the cities 
was published. The guide presented irst-hand sources includ-
ing maps, timelines, character bios and encyclopedic entries 
that further reveal the secrets of these cities. One of the docu-
ments provided a description of Victor Horta, the famous turn 
of the century, Belgian, art-nouveau architect. The entry states 
that Horta has had the largest inluence over the obscure cities, 
but the direct relationship is never explained. Horta haunts both 
worlds, transcending the real and the imaginary. 
A decade after Victor Horta dies, Expo ’58 is held in Brussels. 
The Expo was the irst major World’s Fair following World 
War II.  As a celebration of universality and global progress, 
the United Nations was ofered its irst pavilion. The ideal of 
global governance was relatively unjaded, if yet un-attempt-
ed. Designers built exuberant monuments to the triumph of 
Modernism. Perhaps the most impressive was Atomium. 
Representing the unit cell of an iron crystal scaled up 165 bil-
lion times, Atomium is the icon of the exhibition and punctu-
ation to the end of an era.  Perhaps the most awkwardly literal 
registration of the historical materialist system of progress, 
Atomium was a pinnacle signiier of the Modern project. 
Composed of ten stainless steel spheres each 59 feet in diam-
eter, the monument stood 335 feet tall, providing sweeping 
vistas of Brussels. A slightly scaled back translation of Vlat-
amir Tatlin’s unbuilt Monument to the Third International, 
Atomium was, just as the Soviet critic Viktor Shklovsky said 
in 1917 of Tatlin’s design, a monument “made of steel, glass 
and revolution.” (Ching 2011, 716) The truth of the Marxist 
agenda had yet to be articulated, however, and the ’90s were 
still several decades away. Serendipitously however, another 
shiny metal sphere at the Expo was making waves: the world 
irst artiicial satellite, Sputnik. A full scale replica of Sputnik 
1 hung in the Soviet Union pavilion and mysteriously disap-
peared sometime during the exposition—another haunting.
“At the Moment of Sputnik the Planet Became a Global The-
ater in Which There are No Spectators But Only Actors,” 
the title of a 1974 essay by Marshal McLuhan, describes 
Sputnik as a revolutionary event. McLuhan writes: “on 
Spaceship Earth or in the global theater the audience and 
the crew become actors, producers rather than consumers. 
They seek to program events rather than to watch them. 
As in so many other instances, these ‘efects’ appear before 
their ‘causes.’” (McLuhan 1974, 57) For McLuhan, new media 
enables man to move past conventions of language and the “one-at-a-timeness” 
of “the linearity of the signiier” presented by Ferdinand de Saussure, towards the 
“all-at-onces” made possible by the new technology. 
It was on the newly constructed “Spaceship Earth” where the authors of Les Cités 
Obscures were born, in Brussels, 1956. Before Francois was born, Schuiten’s father, 
Robert Schuiten, was irst and foremost a painter; he later reluctantly became 
a Modernist architect to support his growing family. When Schuiten was born, 
his father was working on the designs and construction of Expo ’58. The authors 
witnessed irst-hand the birth of the new historic epoch. They lived through the 
erasure of historic sites and their replacement by anonymous modern residential 
and commercial buildings. Schuiten later termed this material production Brus-
selization. A critique of Brusselization plays an essential role in the collaborative 
work of Schuiten and Peeters, not only through the themes of their writing but 
also activist work to preserve buildings by Victor Horta, including Maison Autrique, 
the ghost materialized. Though encouraged to study architecture by his father, 
Schuiten refused to become an architect and participate in the Brusselization he 
so detested; instead, he became an illustrator. Peeters, while sharing in Schuiten’s 
love for Brussels and hatred of Modern architecture, took a diferent course, pur-
suing not images themselves but the language and meaning of images. Peeters 
received a master’s, then a doctorate in philosophy studying under Roland Bar-
thes. The authors of Brüsel, in other words, were not architects—they were artists, 
experts in and of the image.
The Metropolis, the ideal of the modern city they were born into, as the authors 
knew it, was a myth. The city was not a text, but rather an image—a dialectical 
image. The work of the authors was not to produce manifestos of the Metropolis, 
using the blunt and ubiquitous textual instruments of modernism. The decla-
ration of a manifesto aimed at the Metropolis could only conirm and therefore 
actualize the material accumulation they so detested in their city; instead, they 
set out to produce another world through which their ideas could be aimed: the 
possible cities of Les Cités Obscure and most speciically Brüsel. Brüsel became 
the aim of alternative ideals that would prove to manifest in changes to the physi-
cal world—the aim of a manifesto, but through alternative means. Instead of the 
manifesto, the authors pursued the obtuse third meaning theorized by Barthes, 
Peeters’ teacher. This type of spatial production, somewhere 
between architecture and not, requires an alternative praxis 
of theory. The authorship of Les Cités Obscure by Schuiten 
and Peeters, building on the work Benjamin and Barthes be-
fore them, can be read among the irst of such practitioners. 
What follows is an initial attempt to articulate such a theory.
 
The Metropolis, the essential text of every architect, never 
failed to produce progress. It played a single note rational 
and clear: truth. With the fuel of rationality, the engines of 
Enlightenment thinking shined bright; the evidence was in 
built environments, architecture. The architect focused his 
pursuit of knowledge on the Metropolis. A mis-alignment 
of ambition and ideal, those architectural concepts that 
failed to pass through the Metropolis (failed to properly 
read the text) would be absorbed into the realm of the un-
real. Misses in the actual world re-appear in the imaginary 
world. The architectural concepts that aimed for truth in 
the Metropolis would instantly pass through its theoretical 
construction, and register on the surface of physical reality, 
the city. Architecture, therefore, proved that architectural 
concepts, the pursuit of knowledge by the architect, were 
part of a pursuit for truth. This truth would be a manifesta-
tion of the text of the Metropolis. It followed, therefore, that 
progress could be measured by the accumulation of the 
evidence of good architecture, in space and through time, 
on the surface of the city, a rendering of its ideal form—the 
Metropolis. 
 
With the ideal of progress inextricably tied to accumulation 
in the city, the Metropolis became and remains the dominant 
pursuit of architectural concepts. With progress came such 
rapid accumulation by the city that it became increasing-
ly di cult for architects to make their contributions visible. 
They perpetually fear losing their claim to truth, that the 
public will come to doubt their capacity to contribute to the common good. Out 
of an insecurity, the architects then re-sight their gadgets. They worry that their 
work has somehow drifted from the aim of the Metropolis. To reify their rele-
vance, the architects return to the text of the Metropolis and produce another 
manifesto. Literally meaning “to speak in public,” the manifesto operates as a 
rhetorical recalibration intended to signify to the public that their aim is true. 
Such claims are inherently undeniable. Manifesto also literally means to “to state 
the obvious.”  Progress, the world over, despite the insecurity of the architects, 
was being made. Emboldened by their speech-acts, the architects return to work. 
Architects igured the city (the positive) against non-city (the negative) in real, 
physical space, in concrete and steel. A material grid on which to plot space and 
time, the city signiies progress—a legible text, a historic material composed of 
particles, teeny-tiny Antomiums. 
 
The practice of Schuiten and Peeters manifests an image of reality that is in stark 
contrast to the determined accumulative tendencies of Modernism. The agency 
of this image could represent a much-needed escape route from the enduring, 
insecure expansion of the myth of the Metropolis. By producing alternative ide-
als to the Metropolis, by unleashing an image of possible and unknown future 
truths, the authors have altered both the physical and imaginary reality of the 
cities we occupy. Architects could learn greatly by studying Les Cités Obscures 
and its tangible results. The lessons therein, some of which I have outlined here, 
might mark the opening of an entirely new terrain of space and time upon which 
to practice.  
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She found herself a new man with a strangely shaped, 
soft pallet that lead to a rather ofensive protrusion of his 
two front teeth. I can no longer remember her name.  
She was a foreigner in a Spanish city.  
She wasn’t very attractive, but she gave me whisky, so I 
ate her pussy.  I didn’t stick around and took the bottle 
with me when she went to the toilet.
I can see that kid again. 
Much older and surrounded by bare breasts, 
yet having trouble, once again, enjoying the milk. 
I don’t want no pop.  I don’t want no tea. 
Just give me milk.
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